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Abstract
We analyzed data on all laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1pdm influenza in the 
UK to 10th June 2009 to estimate epidemiological characteristics. We estimated a 
mean incubation period of 2.05 days and serial interval of 2.5 days with infectivity 
peaking close to onset of symptoms. Transmission was initially sporadic but 
increased from mid-May in England and from early June in Scotland. We estimated 
37% of transmission occurred in schools, 24% in households, 28% through travel 
abroad and the remainder in the wider community. Children under 16 were more 
susceptible to infection in the household (adjusted OR 5.80, 95% CI 2.99-11.82). 
Treatment with oseltamivir plus widespread use of prophylaxis significantly reduced 
transmission (estimated reduction 16%). Households not receiving oseltamivir 
within 3 days of symptom onset in the index case had significantly increased 
secondary attack rates (adjusted OR 3.42, 95% CI 1.51-8.55).
Introduction
H1N1pdm influenza, which first emerged in Mexico in March 2009, has now spread 
rapidly across the globe. At the start, this new virus prompted questions about how 
to best use limited resources to mitigate the effects of the pandemic. Pre-pandemic 
modeling work suggested that layered mitigation policies, including the use of 
antivirals and social distancing (such as school closure) could have an important 
impact on overall and peak clinical attack rates [1][2][3][4] . These assessments of 
intervention strategies, however, depended critically on the transmission potential, 
natural history of infection, antiviral effectiveness and age-related patterns of 
susceptibility for the H1N1 pandemic strain.
Early estimates of these quantities for the new virus using data from Mexico 
suggested that the reproduction number, R, was slightly lower than estimated in 
previous pandemics, with estimates in the range 1.4-1.5 [5][6][7] . These data also 
showed higher attack rates in children compared to adults, although this was based 
on observations in a single village and virological confirmation was lacking [5] . 
Early surveillance relying on active case finding highlighted the importance of 
transmission between children in schools in the early phases of the pandemic in 
many countries [8][9][10][11][12] . This may in part have been due to prior cross-
protective immunity in adults, as demonstrated by a serological study [13] . 
However, differences in patterns of mixing between adults and children may also 
have in part determined these apparent differences. Thus detailed epidemiological 
analysis of case data that take into account the place of contact and age-related 
heterogeneities in mixing patterns was required to assess the degree of 
susceptibility compared to the effect of social mixing patterns. These parameters 
are key to assessing the potential impact of school closures and other social 
distancing measures on the speed and overall attack rate of autumn waves of the 
pandemic in the Northern Hemisphere.
As part of the pandemic planning process in the UK, the use of mathematical 
models in real-time was conceived to be part of the overall response and to provide 
direct advice to government. To enable this, data collection studies were also 
planned, designed to collect detailed epidemiological data at an individual level for 
the first few hundred cases.Here we present a comprehensive quantitative analysis 
of these early data collected as part of the epidemiological investigation of 
laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1pdm influenza in the UK up to June 10 th . This 
analysis was undertaken in real-time, providing regular up-to-date advice to the UK 
government during the early phase of the pandemic on the transmission potential, 
attack rates and effectiveness of the containment policy (see UK Department of 
Health Planning Assumptions ). From a scientific perspective, these data uniquely 
provided an opportunity to estimate key transmission parameters that can no longer 
be obtained given the shift away from individual case reporting. Because detailed 
contact tracing of all cases was undertaken, they can be used to directly estimate 
the incubation period and serial interval rather than making indirect inferences from 
case report data or from individual settings [7] . A particular focus of the UK’s 
containment strategy was wide-scale use of oseltamivir both for treating cases and 
prophylaxis of their close contacts. By combining data on timings of treatment and 
prophylaxis with our estimates of susceptibility and onward transmission we were 
therefore able to explore the impact that antiviral use had on onward transmission in 
the first two months of the pandemic.
Methods
Data Sources
We analysed data on all laboratory-confirmed cases from the United Kingdom , 
including age, gender and postcode of the case, dates of symptom onset and of 
laboratory confirmation [14][15] . Recent travel abroad and the date of return to the 
UK, known epidemiological links to other cases, the school attended and antiviral 
treatment were also recorded. The First Few Hundred Cases (FF100) study 
collected more detailed data on a subset of cases including household contacts. 
Household size was assumed to be the sum of all reported household contacts plus 
the index case. Further details of these datasets are presented elsewhere [11][16] . 
We analysed data for the entire UK and in two strata: England/Wales (also including 
a very small number of cases from Northern Ireland) and Scotland.
Source of Infection & Cluster Definitions
Information on known epidemiological links to other cases (household, school and 
reported contact data) was used to partition the data into clusters. A cluster was 
defined as the set of cases with known epidemiological links to each other within the 
UK. The root of each cluster’s infection tree, the cluster index case, was therefore 
either believed to have been infected abroad or had no known epidemiological links 
to earlier cases. As some individuals had more than one potential source of 
infection, we also considered an alternative approach in which the probability of 
infection from each potential source was determined probabilistically using the 
estimates of the incubation period and infectivity distribution (see below and 
Technical Appendix).
Incubation Period and Infectivity Distributions
The incubation period distribution was estimated by maximum-likelihood fitting of a 
Gamma distribution to the 16 cases linked to a single exposure. Data on 60 cases 
who reported travel abroad, had dates of travel recorded and an onset of symptoms 
after their return were used to estimate a minimum incubation period (return date to 
onset date). An individual’s infectivity profile was obtained by fitting a model (see 
technical appendix) to the serial interval data (onset of symptoms in index case to 
onset of symptoms in contact) obtained from 58 individuals with a unique source of 
transmission given the estimated incubation period distribution.
Transmission Models & Age-Dependency in Transmission Rates
We estimated the effective reproduction number R from UK population-level data (i) 
using the observed rate of exponential growth and serial interval distribution [17] , 
with a change-point analysis to test for changes in the rate of epidemic growth; (ii) 
by analysing the distribution of the cluster sizes, accounting for censoring due to 
ongoing transmission within clusters [18] ; (iii) by probabilistically reconstructing the 
epidemic tree using only onset times and the serial interval distribution and 
adjusting for censoring [19][20] . These population-level estimates mask 
considerable heterogeneity in transmission occurring in the early stages of the UK 
epidemic. We therefore developed 3 new inference methods which incorporate 
detailed epidemiological information on the patterns of contact, allowing a more 
accurate assessment of who infected whom. The first two methods extend the tree-
reconstruction method [19][20] . In the first we use the household data and imputed 
cluster identifiers to reconstruct the transmission network based on the observed 
serial interval distribution (Model 1). In the second we incorporate contact 
information as derived probabilistically above based on the estimated incubation 
period and infectivity distributions (Model 2). The third uses the same contact 
information as the second but fits a full epidemic transmission model using a 
renewal equation approach and Bayesian MCMC methods to infer infection times 
and to estimate model parameters, including the reproduction number over time 
(Model 3). Full details for each approach are given in the Technical Appendix. 
Patterns of age-dependent susceptibility to infection were estimated using data on 
the approximate numbers of travelers to the USA and Mexico in different age 
groups obtained from the International Passenger Survey [21] . Assuming the same 
exposure to infection in individuals travelling to these countries, estimates of age-
dependent susceptibility to infection were derived from the observed patterns of 
importation of cases from those countries.
Household Studies
Household secondary attack rates were calculated for cases in the FF100 study. 
The household index case was defined as the case with earliest onset .Households 
with co-primary cases were excluded from the analysis. Secondary cases were 
defined as (a) H1N1 laboratory-confirmed infection or (b) exhibiting clinically defined 
ILI using CDC definitions (fever plus one or more of cough and sore throat). Logistic 
regression was used to assess the dependence of household secondary attack 
rates on household size, age of the index case, age of the secondary contact, 
timing of treatment in the index case and treatment/prophylaxis of household 
members.
Treatment
Using Model 3, we fitted an additional parameter in which the hazard of 
transmission was reduced from the day after treatment started to the end of the 
infection. This fitting was only undertaken in the subset of data from England/Wales 
with missing treatment data considered as additional nuisance parameters within 
the MCMC fitting algorithm.
Results
Data Summary
The first case of H1N1pdm was confirmed in the UK on 27 th April 2009 in an 
individual returning from Mexico. 817 virologically-confirmed H1N1 cases were 
reported to June 10 th 2009. An additional 192 cases were reported after that date 
but had recorded onset of symptoms prior to June 10 th 2009. Of the 817 cases, 490 
had at least one documented potential source of infection. Of these 155 (32%) 
reported recent travel abroad, 169 (34%) reported household contact with a 
confirmed case, 198 (40%) had attended an affected school and 69 (14%) reported 
contact with a confirmed case outside school and household. 295 had associated 
treatment data recorded, with the majority of these being cases that occurred in 
England or Wales.
Contact data was collected for a subset of 355 cases who completed the FF100 
study questionnaire. Of these, following various exclusions (see technical 
appendix), the household analysis was based on 193 households (and hence index 
cases) and 556 secondary household contacts.
Natural History
Using data from those that travelled abroad we estimate a minimum incubation 
period of 1.9 days from their dates of return travel to the UK. Using data from a 
single exposure event (bus travel to a football match on 24 th May 2009) with 16 
secondary cases we estimate an incubation period distribution with mean 2.05 days 
and variance 0.24 days 2 (Figure 1B), consistent with values for seasonal influenza 
A virus (23) . Using these estimates, we obtain an infectivity distribution in which 
infectivity peaks close to the onset of symptoms (Figure 1D) (mean time from 
symptom onset to peak infectivity 0.45 days) with a good fit to the observed serial 
interval distribution (Figure 1C). The true serial interval distribution, allowing for the 
possibility of tertiary transmissions amongst the observed distribution, was 
estimated to have a mean of 2.51 days and standard deviation of 1.55 days.
Fig. 1: A) Time series of 817 confirmed H1N1 cases in England/Wales (red) 
and Scotland (orange) by date of onset of symptoms with sampled missing 
onset dates in blue. Additional cases reported after 10th June but with 
onsets prior to 10th June are shown in green.
B) Fitted incubation period distribution (mean 2.05 days and variance 0.24 days 
2 ). C) Empirical serial interval distribution (green). The blue line shows the fit of 
the model allowing for tertiary transmission and the red line the estimated serial 
interval distribution. D) Estimated infectivity of index cases in relation to their 
onset of symptoms. The graph shows the probability density function of 
estimated infectivity profile after integrating out the index cases’s infection time 
(see technical appendix).
Source of Infection
For the 60% of confirmed cases that reported at least one documented potential 
source of infection, using a method in which multiple recorded sources of infection 
are assigned a probability based on the timing of their infection (see Technical 
Appendix), we estimated amongst those cases that reported at least one source of 
infection that 28% (95% CI: 26-34%) were infected abroad (in either Mexico or 
United States), 37% (95% CI: 33-42%) through contacts made at school and 24% 
(95% CI: 18-26%) within the household, with the remainder of transmission 
occurring outside the household or school locations (including other relatives, 
workplace and social contacts). Cases were geographically dispersed, but with 
central foci around London, Birmingham and Glasgow. 40% of cases had no clear 
epidemiological links to other cases but we cannot exclude the possibility that these 
cases acquired their infection in any of the settings noted above.
A key characteristic of the England/Wales data was the disproportionate number of 
cases in children, driven primarily by school outbreaks (Figure 2A). In contrast, 
outbreak data from Scotland showed less clustering, with household transmission 
playing a greater role (Figure 2B). Also notable is that the England/Wales data 
contained many more cases where infection was most probably acquired abroad 
(36%, 95% CI 31-41%) compared to Scottish data (15%, 95% CI 7-18%). The 
extent to which these differences reflect real epidemiological variation or differences 
in surveillance is unclear.
Fig. 2: Most likely transmission network obtained using Model 2.
Circles represent individuals and lines denote paths of transmission. The large 
green and blue squares represent infection abroad in Mexico and United States 
respectively. Colours of smaller circles represent the school attended, school 
contacts or other location contacts. A) England/Wales and B) Scotland.
Reproduction Number Estimates Over Time
A change-point analysis revealed strong evidence that the epidemic did not grow at 
a constant rate (p=0.010, Davies test) and estimated that the growth rate in the UK 
as a whole changed close to May 15 th (95% CI May 8 th – May 21 th ) (Figure 3A). 
Based on the rate of exponential growth before and after this date, estimated values 
for R were 1.06 (95% CI 0.93-1.19) and 1.44 (95% CI 1.27-1.63), respectively. 
Analysis of the distribution of cluster sizes using UK data up to May 15 th gave a 
similar estimate for the initial R value ( 1.12 [95% CI 0.79 - 1.64]).
Using both tree-reconstruction methods and fitting a full transmission model gives 
greater insight into the changes that occurred in the different regions. In both 
England/Wales and Scotland R stayed close to 1 (the threshold value below which 
transmission cannot be sustained) for the first few weeks of the epidemic (Figure 
3B,C). However, from the middle of May onwards, R estimates rose above 1 for a 
short period of time although they dropped shortly after that in England (Figure 
3B/C). These early estimates were substantially driven by the detection of a small 
number of relatively large school-based outbreaks. From early June sustained 
transmission was clearly underway in both England/Wales and Scotland(Figure 
3B,C) with R estimates in this final period (31 st May to 7 th June) in the range 1.2 to 
1.5 (England/Wales Model 1: R =1.42 (95% CI 1.29-1.57); Model 2: R =1.20 (95% 
CI 1.00-1.41); Model 3: R =1.31 (95% CI 1.09-1.56); Scotland Model 1: R =1.13 
(95% CI 1.03-1.19); Model 2: R =1.41 (95% CI 1.02-2.13); Model 3: R =1.48 (95% 
CI 1.28-1.70)).
Fig. 3: A) Fit of exponential growth model to the time series of onsets.
The red curve shows the best fitting model in which the change in the 
exponential growth rate occurs from May 15th onwards (95% confidence bounds 
and prediction bounds are shown by dotted and dashed lines respectively). 
Circles denote the observed numbers of onsets excluding cases with a reported 
travel history. B) Estimates of the weekly population-level reproduction number 
over time. The white line shows the mean, black shading the interquartile range 
and grey shading the 95% range. C)-D) Estimates of the effective reproduction 
number over different time periods calculated using four different models C) 
England/Wales/Northern Ireland and D) Scotland. Box-plots show R estimates 
for each time period. Period 1 comprises 1a (cases to May 14th) and 1b (May 
15th-May22nd), period 2 is May 23rd-May30th, and period 3 is 1st May-7th 
June. For each period the four box-plots represent (from left to right) models 1 to 
3 and model 4 (population-level reproduction number).
Age Heterogeneity
Analysis of 193 households gave a 5.5-fold higher secondary attack rate for 
confirmed H1N1pdm and 3.6-fold higher secondary attack rate for ILI in child 
secondary contacts compared with adults (Table 1).
Table 1: Univariate attack rates, adjusted odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals 
for the probability of a secondary case in a household with an index confirmed 
H1N1 case by index age, contact age, household size and the time from the index 
onset of symptoms to receipt of prophylaxis in the contacts. Based on analysis of 
556 household contacts of index cases in 193 households in whom the overall 
secondary attack rate for virologically-confirmed A/H1N1 is 8.1% and ILI is 11.2%.
Virologically-confirmed A/H1N1 ILI
Covariate Attack 
Rate
Adjusted Odds 
Ratio (95% CI)
p-value Attack 
Rate
Adjusted 
Odds 
Ratio 
(95% CI)
p-value
Age of the 
contact:
16 years 
and under
31/179 
(17.3%)
5.80(2.99,11.82)<0.001 34/179 
(20.7%)
3.77 
(2.17, 
6.68)
<0.0001
over 16 
years
14/377 
(3.7%)
1.0 - 25/377 
(6.6%)
1.0 -
Age of the 
index case:
16 years 
and under
31/345 
(9.0%)
1.14(0.57, 2.35) 0.78 38/345 
(11.0%)
0.76 
(0.43, 
1.36)
0.34
over 16 
years
14/211 
(6.6%)
1.0 - 24/211 
(11.4%)
1.0 -
Household 
size
- 1.00 (0.85, 1.16)0.62 - 1.05 
(0.92, 
1.19)
0.42
Rapid 
provision of 
oseltamivir 
in the 
household
Yes 8/165 
(4.5%)
1.0 - 19/165 
(11.5%)
1.0 -
No 24/186 
(12.9%)
3.42 
(1.51, 
8.55)
0.005 28/186 
(15.0%)
1.45 
(0.77, 
2.81)
0.26
Not recorded 13/205 
(6.3%)
1.41 
(0.57, 
3.74)
0.46 15/205 
(7.3%)
0.59 
(0.28, 
1.22)
0.16
*Timing of receipt of oseltamivir in household contacts is highly correlated with the 
timing of receipt of treatment in the index case and therefore these two effects 
cannot be distinguished in this analysis.
Furthermore, analysis of the age distribution of cases returning from travel to 
Mexico or the US, adjusted by age-stratified probabilities of travel to these locations, 
gave higher risk of infection in children compared to adults, consistent with a higher 
susceptibility (Figure 4).
Fig. 4: Estimates of the age-specific relative risk of infection abroad
obtained by analyzing cases with reported travel history and age-specific 
information on travel to affected countries from the International Passenger 
Survey (22) .
Treatment and Prophylaxis
Of a subset of 295 cases for whom treatment data was available, 271 (94%) 
reported receiving oseltamivir as treatment with a median time from onset of 
symptoms of 3 days (interquartile range 1 to 5 days) (Figure 5A). 93% of their 
household contacts reported receiving oseltamivir with a median time from onset of 
symptoms in the index case of 4 days (Figure 5B). The majority of these contacts 
received oseltamivir as prophylaxis (defined as receipt prior to the onset of 
symptoms if a secondary case or at any time period if a negative contact). Fitting 
the full transmission model allowing a reduction in transmission starting one day 
after treatment started, we found that treatment (in association with prophylaxis 
given to contacts) significantly reduced the hazard of infection (estimate 94%, 95% 
CI 72%-100%). However cases were treated (and their contacts given prophylaxis) 
several days into their infection when we estimate their onward infectiousness had 
already started to decline. Hence the overall impact of treatment and prophylaxis 
needs to take into account these timings. Attributing all the reduction to a direct 
effect of case treatment and using the estimated infectivity profile and the timing at 
which treatment was received we estimate that, at a population-level, treatment of 
cases in association with prophylaxis of their contacts reduced overall transmission 
by 16% (95% CI 12-20%). As a large proportion of this effect may be due to 
widespread prophylaxis in close contacts, the overall impact of a treatment-only 
policy may be substantially less. Overall, our analysis suggests prompter treatment 
and prophylaxis could substantially reduce R , assuming all cases are detected 
(Figure 5C). We also found a significant impact of timing of first receipt of 
oseltamivir by secondary contacts within the household on the risk of confirmed 
infection, with members of households which received oseltamivir more than 3 days 
after the onset of symptoms in the index case significantly more likely to be infected 
compared to members of households that received oseltamivir after this time 
(adjusted odds ratio 3.42, 95% CI 1.51-8.55) (Table 1). Whilst there was also an 
impact of rapid receipt of oseltamivir on ILI, this result was not statistically significant 
(adjusted odds ratio 1.45, 95% CI 0.77-2.81). Those for whom data on the date of 
first receipt in the household was not available were also at higher risk of confirmed 
infection although this result was not statistically significant. Those with no recorded 
treatment times were less likely to have ILI than other groups; however this is likely 
due to a lack of recording of symptoms in these contacts.
Fig. 5: A) Distribution of time from onset of symptoms to receiving 
treatment with oseltamivir in cases.
B) Distribution of the time from onset of symptoms in the index case to receiving 
prophylaxis in 343 contacts of household index cases. C) Estimated relationship 
between the time from onset of symptoms to receiving treatment for confirmed 
cases and the effective reproduction number. The vertical dotted line shows the 
mean time observed in the cases. As a proportion of infectivity occurs prior to 
the onset of symptoms (Figure 1D) treatment cannot fully block transmission.
Discussion
From the first UK H1N1pdm cases in April 2009, transmission in the early weeks 
remained sporadic with early containment measures, including the use of antivirals 
and reactive school closures, reducing the initial rate of growth of the pandemic. 
Thus during this early phase our results indicated that the containment policy was 
effective. However from mid-May sustained transmission was underway in different 
areas of the country. From the end of May, infection spread more widely with values 
for R during this final period (range 1.4 to 1.6) consistent with studies elsewhere [5]
[6][7] , demonstrating that containment was no longer possible. This new H1N1 
virus therefore appears to be less easily transmitted than previous strains. Thus 
second waves of infection now underway are likely to evolve more slowly and have 
lower peak attack rates than predicted by pre-pandemic models.
Our results demonstrate substantial age-related heterogeneity in transmission, with 
children playing a key role via school-based outbreaks. Age-related case 
ascertainment bias could account for some of this observation. However, two pieces 
of evidence demonstrate increased susceptibility amongst children. First, analysis of 
secondary household attack rates indicated significantly higher susceptibility to 
infection in children compared to adults. Second, analyses of age-stratified infection 
rates among travellers to Mexico and the US also suggest higher susceptibility in 
children, consistent with a larger household-based study of H1N1pdm in the United 
States [22] . These differences in susceptibility are likely due to partial immunity in 
adults, as shown by higher levels of cross-reactive antibodies in serological studies 
undertaken in the US [13] . Further serological surveys are required to more fully 
interpret these age-patterns.
Using detailed contact tracing data we were able to directly estimate a mean 
incubation period of 2.05 days, consistent with estimates from seasonal influenza 
[23] , and a mean serial interval of 2.5 days. By combining these estimates it is clear 
that onward infectivity peaks close to the onset of symptoms, and thus that a 
substantial amount of transmission occurs prior to the onset of symptoms. We 
estimated a significant reduction in infectiousness from the time 
treatment/prophylaxis was received. However, it is not possible to estimate to what 
extent this was due to treatment of the index cases or due to the effectiveness of 
prophylaxis in preventing infection, due to the widespread provision of both during 
this containment phase. Thus the overall impact of a treatment-only policy on 
transmission may be substantially less than our 16% estimate, as suggested by 
prior modeling [3] . In addition, if only a proportion of all cases were ascertained in 
the early epidemic (as seems probable) the net effect of antiviral use on the 
epidemic will have been even smaller. We also found a significant impact of rapid 
provision of oseltamivir to household contacts, with a 71% reduction in laboratory-
confirmed H1N1pdm influenza and 31% reduction in symptom-based ILI in those 
contacts whose household received oseltamivir within 3 days of onset of symptoms 
in the index case compared with members of households who received oseltamivir 
later than this. Whilst this effect is robust (see sensitivity analyses in Technical 
Appendix), its magnitude is uncertain due to the small numbers of secondary cases. 
Based on previous studies [24][25][26] it is biologically more plausible that the 
protective effect observed was largely due to prophylaxis. An important caveat is 
that 44% of household contacts were missing information on the time of antiviral 
use and substantial bias can therefore not be precluded.
One limitation of our analyses is that they rely on laboratory-confirmed cases. One 
surveillance scheme run in sentinel primary care settings identified 6 cases during 
the first month of the pandemic. This survey covers a population of approximately 
400,000 individuals giving an incidence of 1.5 per 100,000 population per month. 
Thus in a population of 61 million people we would have expected 915 cases (95% 
CI 183 – 1646) in total to have sought medical attention, higher than the 253 
reported by this date. Thus it may be that the confirmed cases represent a small 
proportion of all early cases. In a similar scheme in Scotland where the coverage is 
approximately 100,000 patients in 20 GP practices, no cases were identified. The 
surveillance protocol used involved primarily testing clinical cases of ILI if they had 
an epidemiological link to other confirmed cases or an H1N1pdm-affected country. 
As the outbreak progressed, clinical surveillance also identified several large school-
based outbreaks the scale of which prompted testing even in the absence of 
epidemiological linkage. Thus, the active case finding-based surveillance approach 
adopted may have preferentially identified large outbreaks in schools over smaller 
clusters of cases in the wider community, leading to potential case ascertainment 
biased.
Following the shift to ILI-based reporting for H1N1 from July onwards, sustained 
transmission of H1N1pdm influenza continued in the UK over the summer months, 
albeit at a lower rate. The central role that children and schools played in the early 
phase of the pandemic, coupled with the observed reduction in transmission over 
the summer indicate that the normal closure of schools over the summer holiday 
period may have reduced transmission. The characteristics of the early phase of the 
pandemic, with milder illness occurring predominantly in children, is consistent with 
milder pandemics (such as 1957) and other epidemics such as the outbreak of 
H1N1 swine influenza in the United States in 1976 [27] . This is further supported by 
the pattern of cases and limited severe disease in the Southern Hemisphere 
indicating a relatively mild virus. However, continued careful epidemiological and 
virological monitoring of the transmission characteristics of the virus over the UK 
influenza season is required to detect any changes in virulence.
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